cm_whatsapp_bot_v1/apps/web/src/lib/auth-cookie.test.ts
yiekheng 27b7a3df1f feat(web): edge-safe HMAC-signed session cookie
signSession + verifySession run on Edge runtime (Web Crypto only).
Verifier checks signature (constant-time compare), expiry, clock-skew
on iat (60s tolerance), token version vs OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION env,
and role-shape sanity. 11 unit tests cover round-trip plus every
rejection path attackers could probe.
2026-05-10 17:43:01 +08:00

98 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from "vitest";
import {
signSession,
verifySession,
COOKIE_NAME,
DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS,
type SessionPayload,
} from "./auth-cookie";
const SECRET = "test-secret-not-used-anywhere-real";
const NOW = 1_700_000_000; // 2023-11-14 — fixed clock for determinism
beforeAll(() => {
process.env.AUTH_SECRET = SECRET;
process.env.OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION = "1";
});
const validPayload = (): SessionPayload => ({
userId: "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
role: "admin",
iat: NOW,
exp: NOW + DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS,
v: 1,
});
describe("auth-cookie", () => {
it("signSession + verifySession round-trips a valid payload", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession(validPayload(), SECRET);
const verified = await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW);
expect(verified).toEqual(validPayload());
});
it("rejects when the payload portion has been tampered with", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession(validPayload(), SECRET);
// Flip the role to admin → user in the payload, keep the same signature.
const [, sig] = cookie.split(".");
const tampered = btoa(JSON.stringify({ ...validPayload(), role: "user" }))
.replace(/\+/g, "-")
.replace(/\//g, "_")
.replace(/=+$/, "") + "." + sig;
expect(await verifySession(tampered, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects when the signature has been tampered with", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession(validPayload(), SECRET);
const [payload] = cookie.split(".");
const tampered = payload + ".AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
expect(await verifySession(tampered, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects when verified with a different secret", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession(validPayload(), SECRET);
expect(await verifySession(cookie, "different-secret", NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects an expired cookie (exp <= now)", async () => {
const expired = { ...validPayload(), exp: NOW - 1 };
const cookie = await signSession(expired, SECRET);
expect(await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects a cookie issued in the future beyond clock-skew tolerance", async () => {
const future = { ...validPayload(), iat: NOW + 120 };
const cookie = await signSession(future, SECRET);
expect(await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("accepts a cookie issued slightly in the future (within 60s skew)", async () => {
const future = { ...validPayload(), iat: NOW + 30 };
const cookie = await signSession(future, SECRET);
expect(await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW)).not.toBeNull();
});
it("rejects a cookie whose v is stale (token-version bumped)", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession({ ...validPayload(), v: 1 }, SECRET);
process.env.OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION = "2";
expect(await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
process.env.OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION = "1";
});
it("rejects a cookie with an unknown role string", async () => {
const cookie = await signSession(
{ ...validPayload(), role: "superadmin" as never },
SECRET,
);
expect(await verifySession(cookie, SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects a cookie that doesn't have a '.' separator", async () => {
expect(await verifySession("not-a-cookie", SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
expect(await verifySession("", SECRET, NOW)).toBeNull();
});
it("exposes COOKIE_NAME as 'session'", () => {
expect(COOKIE_NAME).toBe("session");
});
});