security: untrack envs/ENV (leaked DB password + AUTH_SECRET)

Commit 6893ca6 accidentally pushed envs/ENV — a real env file with
DATABASE_URL (including the wabot DB password) and AUTH_SECRET.
The file's gone from HEAD now; the secrets are STILL in git history
at 6893ca6 and must be rotated:

  1. Postgres role 'waBot' password — change on the wabot DB and
     update DATABASE_URL on every deploy that uses it.
  2. AUTH_SECRET — regenerate with scripts/gen_auth_secret.sh and
     bump OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION at the same time so every existing
     session cookie also invalidates.

.gitignore now ignores everything in envs/ except .env.example so
the same shape of leak (envs/<anything>) can't recur.

If you'd rather scrub the secret from history outright, the only
clean option is a force-push that rewrites 6893ca6:
  git filter-repo --invert-paths --path envs/ENV
  git push --force origin master
That destroys the existing remote SHA, which other clones will need
to reset to. Defaults to 'rotate, don't rewrite' unless explicitly
asked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
yiekheng 2026-05-10 22:14:44 +08:00
parent 6893ca6ba9
commit 58b249097a
2 changed files with 7 additions and 50 deletions

7
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ apps/web/public/swe-worker-*.js
# ARE committed to this private Gitea. Only ignore example overrides: # ARE committed to this private Gitea. Only ignore example overrides:
.env.local .env.local
.env.*.local .env.*.local
# Anything inside envs/ EXCEPT the example template — a real env
# file (envs/ENV) leaked once into commit 6893ca6 carrying the DB
# password and AUTH_SECRET. Whitelist .env.example explicitly so a
# future copy-paste of envs/.env.example into envs/ENV (or any other
# name) gets blocked at git add time.
envs/*
!envs/.env.example
# logs # logs
*.log *.log

View File

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# === Postgres ===
DATABASE_URL=postgres://waBot:cJe3SGjHHAitNBE4@192.168.0.210:5432/wabot
# === App data paths (inside containers) ===
DATA_DIR=/data
SESSIONS_DIR=/data/sessions
MEDIA_DIR=/data/media
# === Bot service ===
BOT_HEALTH_PORT=8081
BOT_LOG_LEVEL=info
# Reminder fan-out tuning. Defaults aim for an established WhatsApp
# account (~30-60 msg/min safe band). Bump cautiously.
# BOT_FIRE_CONCURRENCY pg-boss workers; max accounts firing in parallel.
# BOT_GROUP_CONCURRENCY per-account parallel group sends; parts within a
# group stay serial.
# BOT_MAX_SEND_PER_MINUTE per-account token-bucket rate.
BOT_FIRE_CONCURRENCY=8
BOT_GROUP_CONCURRENCY=3
BOT_MAX_SEND_PER_MINUTE=40
# === Seed (used by scripts/db.sh seed) ===
# The bootstrap operator's username. After seed, set their password
# via: echo 'change-me-now' | scripts/set-password.sh admin
SEED_OPERATOR_USERNAME=admin
SEED_OPERATOR_NAME=Operator
# === Web / Auth ===
# Port the Next.js container exposes on the host. Production deployment
# (wabot.04080616.xyz) uses 8100; dev/staging (test.04080616.xyz) uses 9000.
WEB_PORT=8100
# 32-byte secret used to derive the AES-256-GCM key for session cookies.
# DO NOT leave blank — the web container will refuse to issue cookies.
# Generate via: scripts/gen_auth_secret.sh --write
AUTH_SECRET=86f656580a58f03b6ccb43d257e0e801ecd5356e042e8886b3c7c569e29ff13c
# Bumping this invalidates every outstanding session cookie globally on
# the next request. Treat it as a kill switch (e.g. after a key leak)
# rather than a routine value.
OPERATOR_TOKEN_VERSION=1
# === Docker Registry (used by scripts/publish.sh) ===
# Tag pushed alongside latest. Override with the CLI arg or
# DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG=v1.2.3 scripts/publish.sh.
DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG=latest
# Buildx target platforms. linux/amd64 is the prod host arch; add
# linux/arm64 if you cross-build for an Apple-silicon runner.
CM_IMAGE_PLATFORMS=linux/amd64